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This dissertation provides evidence that a firm’s stock price movements
affect its customer demand. I develop a model in which customers learn about
a firm’s product quality partially from its stock price. This learning induces
feedback from the price to customer demand. Furthermore, the firm man-
ager adjusts product launch decisions in anticipation of these demand shifts.
Consistent with the model’s implications, I find that non-fundamental price
declines due to mutual fund redemptions reduce sales and online customer
interest. This depressed demand is accompanied by a lower probability of
product launches. My findings underscore the real effects of financial market
prices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The extent to which financial market prices convey information to real
decision makers has intrigued economists for decades. Such feedback from
prices can explain otherwise puzzling patterns in asset prices and business
cycles, but direct micro-level evidence is relatively scarce. The few existing
empirical studies primarily focus on demonstrating that managerial learning
from stock prices affects firms’ financing and investment decisions.1 Anecdotal
evidence, however, suggests that corporate executives are also concerned about
potential negative spillovers from stock market undervaluation to customer
decisions.2 Guided by a parsimonious theoretical model featuring customer
learning from stock prices, this paper evaluates whether customer demand re-
sponds to stock price movements using novel data and an instrumental variable
design. I also assess whether firm managers incorporate such shifts in demand
when making product launch decisions.
1See Bond et al. (2012) for a comprehensive survey of this literature, dating back to
Hayek (1945). A detailed literature review is provided in the next section.
2Several public companies recently filed lawsuits against hedge funds, claiming that price
manipulation by the defendants caused severe damage to the plaintiffs reputations, product
sales, relationships with stakeholders, etc. These companies include Biovail Corporation,
Fairfax Financial Holdings, and Overstock.com, among many others.
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A priori, because stock prices aggregate market participants’ private
information, the collective wisdom revealed in prices should provide valuable
incremental information to customers.3 However, empirically identifying this
relationship is challenging due to the lack of detectable exogenous variation in
stock prices and precise measures of customer purchase decisions. I address
these concerns by isolating price pressure induced by non-discretionary mutual
fund redemptions and collecting a direct and high-frequency measure of cus-
tomer demand from Google Trends. In the instrumental variable regressions, I
find that a firm’s underperformance in the stock market leads to lower sales and
lower shopping-related Google search volume, which suggests that customers
negatively update their evaluation of the firm’s products from the unfavorable
stock price signals. Further strengthening the learning explanation, these ef-
fects are more pronounced when more potential customers are aware of the
firm’s stock price (i.e., online financial interest in the firm is higher). Lastly,
I present evidence that the fund outflow-induced price pressure also lowers a
firm’s product launch probability, which implies that firm managers take the
customer learning into account when making product launch decisions.
To formalize the customer learning mechanism and deliver testable im-
plications, I develop a theoretical model with feedback effects from a firm’s
stock price to its product demand. In the model, the firm offers a product
with uncertain quality. Conceptually, product quality can be interpreted as
attributes that affect the total value a customer can derive from the prod-
3This paper studies both business and individual customers.
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uct, including durability, popularity, maintenance, and future complementary
products. Product demand is determined by a representative customer’s ex-
pectation about the quality, which is formed based on the firm’s stock price
as well as a private signal.4 The firm’s stock trades in a competitive financial
market consisting of speculators who are privately informed about the prod-
uct quality. The supply of the stock is subject to an unobservable noise trader
shock that represents trading due to non-fundamental reasons (Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980)). In equilibrium, the stock price partially reveals speculators’
private information and thus serves as a signal about product quality for the
customer.
A natural prediction of the model is that the product demand declines
when the firm’s stock price is lower. However, this relationship can also be
explained by mechanisms other than customer learning from stock prices (e.g.,
omitted variables and reverse causality). To address this challenge, I derive
from the model a prediction that is unique to the customer learning channel.
Specifically, I examine the effect of noise trading on product demand. While
the intention of the customer is to extract information about product quality
from the stock price, he inevitably misinterprets price declines caused by noise
trading as negative signals about the product quality. This learning mistake
occurs because noise trader shocks are not separately observable from the stock
4In the model, the firm’s product demand is equivalent to its cash flow. The private
signal of the customer simply represents the component in the cash flow that is unknown
to the speculators. In reality, this private signal can be interpreted as all information about
product quality that the customer obtains from sources other than the stock price or, more
abstractly, as exogenous changes in customer tastes.
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price. As a result, unfavorable noise trader shocks lower the demand for the
firm’s product.
I test this prediction of the model using an instrumental variable intro-
duced in Edmans et al. (2012). In particular, when mutual funds experience
extreme outflows, the fund managers are forced to liquidate a portion of their
portfolios within a short period of time, causing substantial negative price
effects on the stocks commonly held by the distressed funds. To remove dis-
cretionary selling by the fund managers, I compute the hypothetical trades
of the distressed funds, assuming that their existing holdings are sold propor-
tionally to ex-ante portfolio weights.5 Furthermore, I show that there is no
significant decline in a firm’s stock return, sales or online customer interest
before large mutual fund redemption shocks. These results serve as a rebuttal
against the argument that fund outflows are caused by the underperformance
of the portfolio stocks. Lastly, similar to the noise trader shock in the model,
this instrument is not observed by potential customers in the concurrent pe-
riod because mutual fund holdings and flows are disclosed to the public with
a delay. When a firm’s stock price is impacted by these mutual fund redemp-
tions, customers, by mistake, negatively update their evaluation of the firm’s
product quality.
Using this instrument and data from Compustat, I first document a sig-
5I also exclude sector funds to avoid endogenous effects of industry trends and portfolio
holdings with large negative ex-ante return contributions to alleviate the concern that fund
outflows may be caused by poor performance of the holdings.
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nificant negative effect of fund outflow-induced price pressure on sales. Specif-
ically, I estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression while controlling
for a large set of ex-ante characteristics and firm and time fixed effects. The
result suggests that during the sample period 1980 to 2014, a decrease of 10
percentage points in quarterly stock returns reduces the sales-to-assets ratio
by 2.2% of its average level in the concurrent quarter. This negative effect
sustains for up to four quarters and dissipates afterwards.
While the sales result is consistent with the view that stock price fluctu-
ations affect customer purchase decisions, the possibility exists that this result
could be explained by firms’ operational changes due to managerial learning
from stock prices and external financial constraints.6 I conduct a series of em-
pirical analyses to address this concern. First, I obtain the shopping-related
search volume index from Google Trends to proxy for online customer interest.
This measure more precisely captures customer decisions and mostly avoids the
confounding effects of changes in product pricing on dollar sales. The sample
covers more than 2,000 firms from 2004 to 2014, which maintains the generality
of the results. Using the same instrumental variable design as in the previous
analysis, I find that online customer interest declines by 5.3% of its average
level when the monthly stock returns decrease by 10 percentage points. Impor-
tantly, the responses in sales and online customer interest both occur during
6Specifically, firm operations may change in response to non-fundamental stock price
fluctuations because the manager of the firm learns from stock price movements or exter-
nal financing becomes more costly. Customers then adjust their demand because of these
changes in the firm, instead of learning from the stock price.
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the same quarter or month as the mutual fund redemption shocks. These
immediate effects are unlikely to be driven by firm-initiated changes (e.g., in-
vestment), which, given the substantial adjustment costs, should require more
than one quarter to affect customer demand.7
To provide further evidence that supports the customer learning mech-
anism, I also explore the heterogeneity in the effects across ex-ante measures of
online attention to the firm’s stock. Intuitively, a necessary condition for po-
tential customers to learn from the stock price is that they must first be aware
of it. While the customer in the model always precisely knows the firm’s stock
price, customers in reality may have limited attention. Therefore, the customer
learning channel predicts that the effects of the instrumented stock return on
the sales-to-assets ratio and the shopping-related Google search volume should
both be stronger when there are more finance-related Google searches for the
company or more searches for the stock ticker of the company. My empirical
tests confirm this hypothesis. It is worth noting that this result is difficult to
reconcile with the aforementioned alternative explanations related to opera-
tional changes in the firm.
The effects of non-fundamental stock price variation on sales differ
across industries. For example, the effect is sizable in the consumer durables
industry, while insignificant in the consumer nondurables industry. This re-
7The main regressions examine customer demand in the concurrent period to avoid con-
founding effects. However, similar results are found if I instead use the lagged stock return
and instrument, as suggested in Table 6.
6
sult implies that concerns about long-term maintenance may be an important
reason for consumers to care about the producer’s stock market performance.
Furthermore, customer demand in industries with limited product differenti-
ation should not be affected by non-fundamental stock price changes because
customers have no need to learn about quality. Consistent with this hypoth-
esis, I find no significant effects in the energy and chemicals industries. Al-
though suggestive, the cross-industry analysis helps to paint a more complete
picture about the process of customer learning from stock prices.
In the final section of this paper, I assess whether firm managers incor-
porate customer learning from stock prices in their decision making process.
Specifically, my model predicts that the manager of the firm is less likely to
launch a new product when noise trading adversely impacts the firm’s stock
price. Rather than learning about quality from the stock price, the manager
simply wants to avoid the depressed customer demand triggered by lower stock
returns. I test this hypothesis using data on press releases of new products and
services. The result shows that when the instrumented stock return decreases
by 10 percentage points, the monthly probability of product launches decreases
by 0.89 percentage points (i.e., 9.1% of the average launch probability).
1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes primarily to the literature that examines the real
effects of financial market prices. In particular, I focus on testing the channel
that real decision makers extract market participants’ private information from
7
stock prices and use it to facilitate their decisions. Theoretical studies on this
topic include Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999),
Subrahmanyam and Titman (2013), Khanna and Sonti (2004), Goldstein and
Guembel (2008), Goldstein et al. (2013), Peress (2014), Edmans et al. (2015),
and Sockin (2015), among many others. The main intuition of my model is
similar to Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) and Stoughton et al. (2001).
In the former paper, the authors examine a theoretical model in which firms’
stakeholders, including customers, make decisions conditional on the stock
price. Their main point is that complementarities across stakeholders can
generate cascades in the firm’s fundamental value and stock price. The latter
paper examines how customer learning about product quality from stock prices
affects firms’ IPO decisions. Compared with these two papers, my model
jointly determines customer demand and the stock price in the secondary
market while allowing for feedback effects from the stock price to the firm’s
cash flow. Furthermore, these two papers do not conduct empirical analyses to
test whether customers learn from stock prices or the possible implications of
this type of learning on firm decisions. Therefore, this paper, to my knowledge,
is the first to provide direct empirical evidence that stock price fluctuations
affect customer purchase decisions.
The empirical corporate finance literature that evaluates whether learn-
ing from stock prices affects decisions in the real economy has grown dra-
matically in the past decade. The earliest studies in this literature are Luo
(2005), which shows that the market reaction to a merger and acquisition an-
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nouncement predicts the probability of deal completion, and Chen et al. (2007),
which shows that the investment-Q sensitivity is higher when a firm’s stock
price is more informative. Subsequent studies strengthen these earlier findings
by examining the relationship between cross-listing and managerial learning
from stock prices (Foucault and Gehrig (2008), Foucault and Fre´sard (2012)),
learning from peers’ stock prices (Foucault and Fresard (2014)), and the time
evolution of price informativeness (Bai et al. (2016)). Complementary evi-
dence is also discovered by marketing researchers. In particular, Markovitch
et al. (2005) find that in the pharmaceutical industry, firms whose stocks
underperform relative to the industry average subsequently adopt different
marketing strategies from the outperformers. Unlike my paper, these stud-
ies do not use an instrumental variable to address the endogeneity of stock
prices; instead, they rely on predictable variations in learning intensity for
identification. Other alternative identification strategies, including structural
estimation (Bakke and Whited (2010)) and natural experiments that shock
the source of information in stock prices (Edmans et al. (2016)), also lead to
evidence supporting the view that firm mangers learn from stock prices.
The mutual fund redemption instrument used in this paper is first pro-
posed in Edmans et al. (2012) to examine whether stock underpricing increases
the likelihood of takeovers. Other papers that use price pressure induced by
mutual fund flows to isolate exogenous variations in stock prices include Khan
et al. (2012), Hau and Lai (2013), Dessaint et al. (2016), and Williams and
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Xiao (2016).8 The primary difference between my empirical findings and those
in the existing literature is that I specifically examine customer learning from
stock prices and its effects on firms’ sales, online customer interest, and product
launch decisions, while previous papers mainly focus on managerial learning
and its effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions.
8Williams and Xiao (2016) is another paper that emphasizes learning from stock prices
by stakeholders instead of the firm’s own managers. They show empirically that suppliers
learn from customers’ stock prices to guide their relationship-specific investments. My paper
is distinct from theirs in terms of the direction of learning (i.e., mine is the reverse of theirs).
Because of the different learning mechanism, I also examine different outcome variables and
cross-sectional analyses. Furthermore, my empirical tests are motivated by and provide
support for a theoretical model that explains the effects of customer learning from stock
prices on firms’ cash flows and product launch decisions.
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Chapter 2
Economic Setting
To concretely describe the economic mechanism of customer learning
from stock prices, I develop a rational expectations model consisting of a firm,
a customer and a competitive stock market similar to that in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980). In this section, I describe the setup of the model and derive
testable implications.
2.1 Model Description
The firm in this model sells a product with quality z to a representa-
tive customer (either a business or an individual) who does not have perfect
information about z. Quality can be interpreted as the level of customer satis-
faction with regard to the products or services now, or the reliability of the firm
to provide maintenance and follow-ups in the long run. The prior distribution
of z is given by N(z¯, vz). The customer learns about the product quality from
the firm’s stock price p and a private signal η = z+ η with η ∼ N(0, vη). The
cash flow generated by selling the product is determined by the customer’s
perception about z. Specifically, the firm’s cash flow is given by
f = E[z|p, η], (2.1)
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where E[·|p, η] denotes the customer’s expectation conditional on p and η. The
functional form of f can be interpreted in two ways. First, when the perceived
quality is high, customers are willing to pay a higher price per unit of the
product, as they are able to derive more utility from it. Second, holding the
product price constant, a higher perceived quality can attract more customers
to purchase the product.
The financial market consists of a measure-one continuum of specula-
tors with exponential utility. They allocate their wealth between a risk-free
asset with zero net return and the risky equity issued by the aforementioned
firm. The supply of the risky asset is x¯ + x, where x ∼ N(0, vx) is the noise
trader shock, representing trading due to non-informational reasons. The spec-
ulators are endowed with perfect information about the product quality z.1
However, they still face the risk induced by the noise component in the cus-
tomer’s private signal (η). This noise component can be interpreted literally
as the inaccurate information about product quality that customers obtain
from sources other than the firm’s stock price or, more abstractly, as exoge-
nous changes in customer tastes.
The timeline of the model is as follows. At date 1, the speculators trade
the firm’s stock. Their private information about the firm’s product quality is
impounded in the stock price. The customer forms his expectation about the
1This assumption is made to simplify the math. The empirical predictions of the model
remain unchanged when the speculators are endowed with heterogeneous noisy signals about
the product quality and also learn from the stock price.
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firm’s product quality using his private signal as well as the firm’s stock price.
At date 2, the cash flow of the firm is realized. The speculators then consume
their terminal wealth.
1. The speculators trade the firm’s stock
based on their perfect private information
about the product quality.
2. The customer forms his expectation
about the product quality based on his
private signal η and the stock price p.
t = 1
1. The cash flow of the firm
is realized.
2. The speculators consume
their terminal wealth.
t = 2
2.2 Financial Market Equilibria
I consider the set of equilibria in which the firm’s stock price is linear in
the product quality z and the noise trader shock x. Given this structure, the
signal on product quality derived from the stock price takes the form ζ = z+ζ ,
where ζ is distributed as N(0, vζ). Since the customer’s expectation about z
depends on his private signal η and the stock price signal ζ, the cash flow of
the firm can be rewritten as
f =
v−1z z¯ + v
−1
ζ ζ + v
−1
η η
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
. (2.2)
The optimal level of demand for the firm’s stock that solves the spec-
ulators’ portfolio choice problem is given by
q∗ =
E[f |z]− p
aV [f |z] , (2.3)
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where a > 0 is the coefficient of risk aversion, E[·|z] denotes the speculators’
expectation conditional on z, and V [·|z] is the corresponding conditional vari-
ance. Since the speculators have perfect information about the product quality
z and observe the public signal ζ derived from the stock price, the only com-
ponent in the cash flow that is uncertain to them is the noise in the customer’s
private signal η. Thus, the speculators’ expectation about the firm’s cash flow
f and the corresponding conditional variance are given by
E[f |z] = v
−1
z z¯ + v
−1
ζ ζ + v
−1
η z
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
; V [f |z] = v
−1
η
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
. (2.4)
The equilibrium stock prices are solved using the market clearing condition:
q∗ = x¯+ x. (2.5)
Proposition 1 specifies the equilibrium stock price. The proof is shown in the
appendices.
PROPOSITION 1. There exist two rational expectations equilibria in which
the stock price takes the form
p = A+Bz + Cx,
where
A =
v−1z z¯
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
− av
−1
η x¯
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
;
B =
v−1ζ + v
−1
η
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
;
and
C = − a(v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
.
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The values of vζ that correspond to the two equilibria are given in the appen-
dices.
In this model, there are two equilibria with different price informative-
ness. In the equilibrium with high v−1ζ (equilibrium 1 hereafter), the stock price
depends more on the product quality z and less on the noise trader shock x.
The customer finds the stock price to be more informative and thus relies less
on his private signal. From the perspective of the speculators, the unknown
component of the firm’s cash flow is the customer’s private information. When
the stock price is more informative and the customer allocates less weight to
his private signal, the cash flow becomes less risky to the speculators. Their
risk aversion leads them to trade more aggressively. (i.e., the speculators’ de-
mand for the stock is more sensitive to z.) As a result, more of their private
information is impounded into the stock price. In other words, the stock price
is more informative, which fulfills the customer’s initial belief. In the equilib-
rium with low v−1ζ (equilibrium 2 hereafter), the opposite process occurs. The
customer allocates less weight to the stock price signal and more weight to
his private signal. The speculators trade less aggressively, since the cash flow
becomes riskier. As a result, the stock price is less informative.
2.3 Feedback Effects of Stock Prices on Customer De-
mand
Since the customer uses the stock price as a signal to form his expecta-
tion about quality, demand for the firm’s product should increase in the firm’s
15
stock price. However, a positive correlation between the customer demand
and the stock price exists even when the customer does not learn from the
stock price. This is because the customer and the speculators have correlated
information regarding the product quality. Changes in product quality (i.e.,
fundamental shocks) can lead to covariation between the customer demand
and the stock price. To derive testable implications that are unique to cus-
tomer learning from stock prices, I examine how noise trader shocks (i.e., non-
fundamental shocks) affect customer demand. Intuitively, when the customer
extracts information about the firm’s product quality from its stock price, he
is unable to distinguish a price drop caused by inferior quality from a price
drop caused an unfavorable noise trader shock. Therefore, non-fundamental
variations in the stock price can also induce changes in customer demand.
Proposition 2 formalizes this prediction. In the appendices, I solve the model
in which the customer ignores the stock price signal ζ. A comparison between
the two models suggests that the prediction in Proposition 2 is true only when
the customer learns from the stock price.
PROPOSITION 2. Demand for the firm’s product (equivalently, the firm’s
cash flow) decreases in the noisy supply of its stock, that is,
∂f
∂x
< 0,
if and only if the customer learns from the stock price.
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2.4 Feedback Effects of Stock Prices on Product Launch
Decisions
In this subsection, I extend the model to examine whether and how
customer learning from stock prices affects firm decisions. In particular, the
manager of the firm decides whether to launch a new product. The quality of
the new product is the same as the existing one but offering a new product
allows the firm to tap into a different market.2 The representative customer
for the new product is endowed with the same private signal η about the
firm’s product quality as the existing customer. The cash flow generated by
selling the new product is given by g = E[z|p, η]. The fixed launching cost
is k. Following Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001), I assume that the firm’s
equity is issued only on the cash flow generated by the existing product (f)
to simplify the computation. As the insider, the manager of the firm has
perfect information about the product quality z, but she is unable to credibly
communicate the true quality to the customer. Let L denote the indicator
variable for the product launch decision. The manager chooses to launch the
product (i.e., L = 1), if the expected cash flow generated by the new product
exceeds the launching cost (i.e., E[g|z] ≥ k). Suppose that before making the
launch decision, the manager of the firm randomly draws a fixed launching
cost k from the distribution Unif(
¯
k, k¯). The unconditional probability of a
2The implications of the model are similar when the quality of the new product is im-
perfectly correlated with the existing product.
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product launch is given by
Prob[L = 1] =

0 if E[g|z] <
¯
k;
E[g|z]−
¯
k
k¯−
¯
k
if
¯
k ≤ E[g|z] < k¯;
1 if E[g|z] ≥ k¯.
(2.6)
Given this setup, the manager faces no uncertainty caused by noise
trading when making the product launch decision. Specifically, since the man-
ager is privately informed about the true quality z and observes the public
stock price signal ζ, she can easily compute the noise trader shock x. Nev-
ertheless, the product launch decision will still respond to x. The manager
follows the market because of the communication barriers between her and
the customer. In particular, since the customer has an imperfect signal about
the product quality, he extracts additional information from the stock price.
As implied by Proposition 2, when a shock increases the noisy supply of the
firm’s stock, the stock price and, consequently, customer demand for the prod-
uct decline. Knowing this effect, the manager of the firm is less willing to
launch a new product even though she knows that the quality of the product
is unchanged. In Corollary 1, I formally demonstrate the relationship between
the product launch probability and the noise trader shock x.
COROLLARY 1. When the manager of the firm anticipates the effect of
customer learning from stock prices on product demand, the firm’s product
launch probability is non-increasing in the noisy supply of its stock, that is,
∂Prob[L = 1]
∂x
≤ 0.
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2.5 Comparison between the Two Equilibria
In this section, I analyze the differences between the two equilibria in
terms of real decision efficiency and stock price volatility. As discussed earlier,
the main difference between the two equilibria is the price informativeness. To
understand real decision efficiency, I examine the ex ante expected net cash
flow of the product launch, which can be expressed as∫ ∞
k
(E[g|z]− k)dF (E[g|z]), (2.7)
where F (E[g|z]) denotes the cumulative distribution function of E[g|z]. Be-
cause the customer learns from the stock price, higher price informativeness
leads to stronger feedback from the stock market to the firm’s cash flow. From
the manager’s perspective, the expected cash flow generated by the new prod-
uct E[g|z] is more volatile ex ante. Furthermore, the opportunity to launch a
new product can be viewed as a real option. The value of the option should
increase in the volatility of the underlying asset. Therefore, the quantity in
equation (2.7) is greater in equilibrium 1. In other words, the manager of the
firm prefers the equilibrium with higher price informativeness. Proposition 3
formalizes this theoretical result. The proof is shown in the appendices.
PROPOSITION 3. The real decision efficiency, as measured by the ex ante
expected net cash flow of the product launch, is greater in the equilibrium with
higher price informativeness.
Next I analyze the two equilibria in terms of stock price volatility. Given
the expression of the stock price shown in Proposition 1, the unconditional
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variance of the stock price can be written as
V [p] = B2vz + C
2vx. (2.8)
As discussed earlier, in the equilibrium with higher price informativeness, the
cash flow is less uncertain to the speculators. In other words, the conditional
variance V [f |z] is relatively low. Therefore, the speculators can better take
actions to offset the noise trader shocks, and consequently better stabilize
the stock price. However, the higher price informativeness also strengthens
customer learning and the feedback effect, which results in more volatile cash
flow and stock price. Since these two types of effects counteract each other,
which equilibrium has a higher stock price volatility depends on the parameter
values.
In Figure 1, I plot the price volatility given different parameter values.
In the first graph, I fix a and vz, and examine how changes in vη and vx affect
the relative levels of price volatility in the two equilibria. Specifically, I consider
the case when a = 2 and vz = 2. When the variance of the noise trader shock
vx is higher, the first type of effect (i.e., higher price informativeness increases
speculators’ ability to offset noise trader shocks and stabilize price) is more
likely to dominate. Therefore, equilibrium 1, which has a more informative
stock price, is likely to have a lower price volatility. When the variance of the
customer’s private signal vη is higher, the volatility of the stock price tends to
be higher in equilibrium 1. This is because the customer learns more from the
stock price when his private signal is less precise, which intensifies the feedback
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from the stock market to the firm’s cash flow. Thus, the second type of effect
(i.e., higher price informativeness leads to more volatile cash flow and stock
price through the feedback mechanism) is more likely to dominate.
In the second graph, I increase the risk aversion coefficient to a = 4.
As shown, the region in which equilibrium 1 has a higher price volatility than
equilibrium 2 shrinks. This is because the same amount of reduction in V [f |z]
leads to a larger change in the stock demand of a more risk averse speculator.
Therefore, the first type of effect tends to dominate. Alternatively, keeping
the risk aversion at a = 2, when I decrease the prior variance vz to 0.4 in the
third graph, equilibrium 1 always has a higher price volatility than equilibrium
2. In the last graph, when I increase vz to 4, equilibrium 1 always has a lower
price volatility. The intuition behind this result is that an increase in price
informativeness leads to a larger reduction in the conditional variance V [f |z]
when vz is relatively high. Therefore, the first type of effect is likely to be
stronger.
[Insert Figure 1 Here.]
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Chapter 3
Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Empirical Methodology
Two empirical elements are essential for testing the main prediction of
the model (Proposition 2): measures of customer demand and an instrument
to isolate non-fundamental stock price changes. In this section, I discuss these
empirical elements in detail, including data sources, variable construction, and
descriptive statistics. Furthermore, I present the empirical specification used
to assess whether customer purchase decisions are affected by the stock market
performance of firms.
3.1.1 Measures of Customer Demand
A great obstacle to empirically assessing whether customers respond to
stock price fluctuations is the lack of large-scale, high-frequency data on pur-
chase behaviors. While researchers in marketing and industrial organization
have collected some high-quality datasets on customer buying decisions, these
datasets usually each focus on a small number of firms in a particular industry
during a short time period. This type of dataset rarely allows enough plausi-
bly exogenous variation in stock prices, restricting the statistical power of the
tests. Furthermore, it is often questionable whether results derived in a spe-
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cific setting can be generalized to other environments. This study overcomes
these limitations by using two complementary measures of customer demand
available for a large sample of firms: sales from Compustat quarterly files and
shopping-related online search volume indices from Google Trends. The first
measure captures the real effect of customer learning from stock prices on
firms, while the second measure more precisely gauges immediate and direct
responses by customers and is less likely to be affected by changes in firm op-
erations. Since the sales data are obtained from a standard data source (i.e.,
Compustat), I omit further description to preserve space. In the rest of this
subsection, I illustrate the collection process of the Google Trends data.
Google Trends is a service provided by Google Inc. that tracks online
search frequencies of user-specified terms. Since its initiation in 2004, Google
Trends data have been applied in various fields of academic research. For ex-
ample, existing finance studies (e.g., Da et al. (2011) and Madsen and Niessner
(2016)) use the search volume index (SV I) on the stock ticker of a firm to cap-
ture retail investor attention. Marketing researchers also use Google searches
to measure prepurchase information acquisition by customers (e.g., Hu et al.
(2014)). In this study, rather than simply requesting an index summarizing
all searches containing the name of a given company, I adopt two advanced
functions of Google Trends to obtain a more precise measure of customer in-
terest: the topic report function and the categorization function. The topic
report function helps to exclude searches on potential alternative meanings of
a company’s name and include other searches related to the company, such
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as searches on alternative or misspelled names, subsidiaries, and products.
Specifically, I apply an automated script to request all topics suggested by
Google using the name of a company as the search term. The script then
collects the SVIs on topics categorized as “company”, “business operation”,
“corporation”, or words with similar meanings. For example, as shown in the
top image in Figure 2, when the word “apple” is used as the search input, a
number of topics are suggested by Google. The automated script collects the
SVI on the topic labeled as “technology company”. If I instead request a re-
port on the word “apple” without specifying a topic, the resulting index would
be based on all searches containing the string “apple”, including searches on
literal apples (i.e., the fruit). Furthermore, when a topic report is requested,
Google uses a proprietary algorithm to combine many search queries related
to the topic. In the previous example, the search volume index on “apple -
technology company” also summarizes searches containing misspellings (e.g.,
“appl”), and searches on products of the firm (e.g., Apple TV and iPhone).
Although the topic report function can clearly measure searches related to
a company, it cannot separately identify customer interest from other types
of online interest. To address this concern, I refine the SVI by selecting the
“shopping” category, as shown in the bottom image in Figure 2. Hu et al.
(2014) also use the categorization function to isolate customer interest.
[Insert Figure 2 Here.]
Admittedly, the shopping-related SV I (SV IShop) is not a perfect mea-
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sure of customer demand. Specifically, SV IShop may erroneously include
other types of online interest rather than customer interest. One factor of
particular concern is that investors may search a company to facilitate their
financial decisions. Thus, stock returns may appear to influence the SV IShop
of a company because investors, rather than customers, respond to price fluc-
tuations. This concern is alleviated by including the SV I of a company in
the “finance” category (SV IF in) as a control variable in the regressions that
examine the effect of stock returns on online customer interest.1 I also control
for the media coverage of a firm to absorb its effect on customer attention.
The variable NewsNum is the total number of news reports on a firm in a
given month, obtained from RavenPack News Analytics. Other control vari-
ables consist of characteristics that are expected to have explanatory power
on the product demand of a firm: firm age, market capitalization (a proxy
for firm size), advertising expense ratio, cost of goods sold ratio, research and
development (R&D) ratio, capital expenditure rate, and industry concentra-
tion. Lastly, I include the firm’s leverage ratio and cash flow rate to control
for the potential effects of financial constraints on customer demand. These
variables are computed using CRSP and Compustat data. Detailed definitions
are provided in Panel A of Table 1.
In Panel B of Table 1, I first present the summary statistics for the sam-
1An alternative approach is to use the SV I of a firm’s ticker (SV IT ic) as a proxy for
online financial interest, following Da et al. (2011). However, SV IF in captures broader
interest in a firm’s financial information. Furthermore, it has a much higher statistical
correlation with SV IShop than SV IT ic. Therefore, using SV IF in as a control is more
conservative. The results are similar when SV IT ic is used, instead.
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ple used in the sales analysis. I begin with all firms in the CRSP/Compustat
merged database during the sample period 1980 to 2014 with non-missing
values for all variables used in the regressions. The sample firms are further
required to have common stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
exchange. Financials (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and public
administration (SIC 9000-9999) are excluded. Potentially unbounded variables
are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. After merging with the instrumental
variable for stock returns discussed later, there are 311,368 firm-quarter ob-
servations and 10,017 distinct firms. The summary statistics of the variables
are comparable with those in previous studies.
The collection process of the Google Trends data starts with the firms
in the sample of the sales analysis during 2004 (the beginning period of
Google Trends) to 2014. There are 4,809 firms in the initial sample. Among
them, 2,133 firms have valid shopping-related search volume indices in Google
Trends. More details regarding the construction of the dataset are provided
in the appendices. In Panel C, I report the summary statistics of the sam-
ple used in the online customer interest analysis. The SVI downloaded from
Google Trends ranges from 0 to 100. Since the index is only comparable
within each firm, I include firm fixed effects in all regressions. The correlation
between SaleToAst and SV IShop is 0.12 (statistically significant at the 1%
level), which suggests that SV IShop is a reasonable proxy for online customer
interest. In terms of media coverage, the average number of news reports
per month for a given firm is 19.5. Since this variable is highly skewed, I
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log-linearize it in the regressions.
[Insert Table 1 Here.]
3.1.2 Instrument for Stock Returns
In addition to the data challenge, detecting the learning mechanism pro-
posed in my model also requires an instrument that can isolate non-fundamental
stock price changes (i.e., a proxy for the noise trader shock in the model).
Specifically, a positive OLS estimate obtained by regressing product demand
on stock returns does not necessarily imply that customers are learning from
stock prices. This is because customers and traders usually have correlated
information regarding the firm’s fundamentals, which induces a positive cor-
relation between demand and stock returns. Since we often cannot perfectly
control for the customers’ information, the OLS estimate is subject to an
omitted variables bias. In addition, exogenous changes in customer tastes
and measurement errors can lead to reverse causality and attenuation biases,
further confounding the OLS estimate.
To isolate the causal effect of stock returns on customer demand, I rely
on an instrumental variable proposed in Edmans et al. (2012) that captures
plausibly exogenous variations in a firm’s stock prices induced by mutual fund
redemptions. The instrument is defined as
MFFlowi,t = −
∑
f∈Ω[TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 + rf,t)]wfi,t−1
V oli,t
, (3.1)
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where Ω is the set of mutual funds with percentage flows less than the 10th
percentile of the sample (i.e., distressed funds), TNAf,t and rf,t are the assets
under management and the net return of fund f in period t, V oli,t is the
dollar trading volume of stock i in period t, and wfi,t−1 is the weight of stock
i in fund f ’s portfolio at the end of period t − 1.2 I multiply the variable by
-1 so that the resulting measure is a positive number. For final use in the
regressions, I merge MFFlow with the CRSP database based on historical
CUSIPs. Missing values of MFFlow are replaced with zeros for firms with
positive mutual fund ownerships at the beginning of the period. More details
regarding the construction of MFFlow are given in the appendices.
The instrument MFFlow is motivated by the finding first documented
in Coval and Stafford (2007) (CS hereafter) that after extreme outflows of
capital, mutual funds are forced to sell existing holdings, causing negative price
pressure on stocks commonly held by such funds. However, rather than using
the actual trading of the distressed funds, as in CS, MFFlow is computed
by assuming that mutual funds sell their existing holdings proportionally to
2The instrument can be computed every quarter or every month. Although the holdings
data are only available at the quarterly frequency, the mutual fund flows can be computed
every month. To compute the MFFlow in month t, I use the holdings at the quarter
end before month t. All quarterly regressions use quarterly MFFlow, while all monthly
regressions use monthly MFFlow. The instrument is constructed using funds experiencing
extreme negative flows and thus only captures negative price pressure. A similar measure can
be constructed using funds experiencing extreme positive flows. However, as shown in Lou
(2012), mutual funds tend to sell their existing holdings proportionally after experiencing
negative flows but do not expand proportionally after experiencing positive flows. In other
words, the instrument constructed using funds with extreme positive flows do not pass the
relevance test.
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ex-ante portfolio weights after extreme outflows. I use the ex-ante weights of
the distressed funds’ portfolios to avoid capturing the discretionary selling by
the fund managers. Actual fund trades after outflows are more endogenous,
since fund managers are more likely to sell stocks with weaker fundamentals
(Huang et al. (2016)).3
A further concern regarding the exogeneity of the instrument is that
mutual fund flows are affected by the fundamentals of their underlying hold-
ings. Specifically, if a fund invests in firms with lower customer demand, it is
more likely to have poorer performance, resulting in outflows. This concern is
particularly relevant for sector funds. During industry downturns, customer
demand shrinks while investors withdraw capital from mutual funds special-
izing in the declining industries. Therefore, I exclude all sector funds from
my sample. Among the diversified mutual funds, outflows may still be driven
by the underperformance of a few concentrated positions. To address this is-
sue, I compute the ex-ante return contribution of each position in a distressed
fund’s portfolio and remove the positions that have large negative return con-
tributions. Specifically, if a fund experiences an extreme outflow from period
t− 1 to t, the ex-ante return contribution of stock i in fund f is computed as
wfi,t−2 ×Returni,t−1, where wfi,t−2 is the weight of stock i in fund f ’s portfolio
3Huang et al. (2016) document that after extreme outflows, mutual fund managers are
more likely to sell stocks with higher ex-ante short interest. The authors argue that short
interest is a proxy for unobservable negative private signals, so the result suggests that fund
managers choose to sell low-quality stocks after extreme outflows. By using the ex-ante
portfolio weights, the instrument MFFlow used in this paper does not capture this type of
selective selling by fund managers.
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at the end of period t − 2, and Returni,t−1 is the return of stock i in period
t−1. I exclude all positions with return contribution less than -0.2% (roughly
the 5th percentile in the sample). The remaining positions in the distressed
fund’s portfolio are unlikely to be the cause of the outflow, but these stocks
could still experience negative price pressure because the distressed fund is
forced to liquidate its portfolio to redeem the investors.4
In Figure 3, I show the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)
around large mutual fund redemption shocks in the top graph, and the cor-
responding quarterly MFFlow in the bottom graph. Specifically, during the
period 1980 to 2014, I take the sample of common stocks that are traded on
the NYSE, Amex, or NASDAQ exchange with non-missing values of MFFlow
and define an event to be a firm-quarter during which MFFlow is above the
90th percentile of the quarter. Abnormal returns are computed using three
different benchmarks: the CRSP equal-weighted index (red), the Fama-French
equal-weighted 48 industry portfolios (blue),5 and the characteristic-matched
portfolios proposed in Daniel et al. (1997) (green). The event window is from
12 months before to 18 months after. As shown in the plot, there is a signif-
icant decline of 4-5% in CAAR during the event quarter, depending on the
benchmark. Compared with the findings in CS, the price decline induced by
my instrument is smaller in magnitude. Furthermore, in contrast to the down-
4Edmans et al. (2012) does not make this adjustment when constructing their instrument.
My main findings are robust to using their original measure.
5The Fama-French industry definitions and portfolio returns used in this paper are ob-
tained from Kenneth French’s website.
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ward pre-trend shown in CS, there is no significant decline in CAAR before
the event in Figure 3, suggesting that these stocks are unlikely to be the cause
of the mutual fund outflows.
[Insert Figure 3 Here.]
3.1.3 Empirical Specification
The main empirical prediction of the model is that non-fundamental
fluctuations in a firm’s stock price affect its product demand if and only if the
representative customer learns from the stock price. The measure MFFlow
can be considered as an empirical proxy of the noise trader shock x in the
model. Besides the relevance and exogeneity criteria discussed in the previ-
ous subsection, MFFlow must satisfy another assumption in order to be a
valid proxy for x: customers cannot distinguish a price movement caused by
MFFlow from that caused by a fundamental shock. This assumption gener-
ally holds because mutual fund holdings and flows are disclosed to the public
with a delay. Furthermore, customers would not be expected to pay close at-
tention to the flows and holdings of the mutual funds that own a firm’s stock,
so they are unlikely to conduct the same analysis during their decision making
process as an econometrician is able to do ex-post.
I test the main predictions of the model using the following 2SLS re-
gressions:
First Stage: Returnit = bmMFFlowit + bcControlsit−1 + eit; (3.2)
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Second Stage: Demandit = βrR̂eturnit + βcControlsit−1 + νit. (3.3)
Returnit denotes the stock return of firm i in period t. R̂eturnit represents the
fitted value of Returnit from the first stage. The dependent variable Demandit
in the second stage regression is a measure of customer demand (either the
sales-to-assets ratio obtained from Compustat or the shopping-related search
volume index obtained from Google Trends). I choose to examine the customer
demand response in the period concurrent to the mutual fund redemption
shocks to avoid confounding effects. Specifically, existing studies document
that variables related to firm operations, such as investments (Hau and Lai
(2013)), takeovers (Edmans et al. (2012)), and seasoned equity offerings (Khan
et al. (2012)) change after non-fundamental shocks to the firm’s stock price.
A potential concern is that these operational changes affect customer demand.
For example, if a firm reduces its R&D after a mutual fund redemption shock,
its customer demand may decline due to the lack of innovative products. Such
an effect cannot be directly attributed to the learning mechanism described in
my model. Examining the concurrent change in demand helps me sidestep this
issue because firms typically face substantial adjustment costs when making
operational changes. Variation in customer demand caused by changing firm
operations is unlikely to manifest in the data during the same period as the
MFFlow shock.
Based on my model’s prediction and the graphic evidence in Figure
3, I expect the first stage coefficient on MFFlow, bm, to be negative and
statistically significant, that is, non-discretionary selling by distressed mutual
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funds reduces a firm’s stock return. More crucial to testing whether customers
learn from stock prices is the sign of the second stage coefficient on R̂eturnit,
βr. Specifically, R̂eturnit represents the non-fundamental fluctuations in the
stock price. As suggested in Proposition 2, if customers extract information
about the product quality from the stock price, then these non-fundamental
fluctuations affect customer demand, that is, βr is positive and statistically
significant. Otherwise, βr should be insignificant.
3.2 Main Results
In this section, I present the main empirical findings of this study,
starting with the effects of stock returns on sales and online customer interest.
I also explore the heterogeneity across ex-ante firm characteristics and the
dynamics of the effects to further shed light on the underlying mechanisms
and distinguish the customer learning channel proposed in the model from
alternative explanations.
3.2.1 Effects of Stock Returns on Sales
In Table 2, I assess the effects of stock price movements on firms’ quar-
terly sales. Dollar sales are divided by lagged total assets to make the measure
more comparable across firms of different sizes. Thus, the dependent variable
is the sales-to-assets ratio (SaleToAst) (i.e., asset turnover). In column (1),
I first examine the OLS regression of SaleToAst on Return, while control-
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ling for the firm characteristics mentioned in Subsection 3.13.1.1.6 Firm fixed
effects are included to remove the time-invariant component of SaleToAst.
Time fixed effects are used to account for potential confounding effects of
macroeconomic conditions, such as financial crises. Standard errors are clus-
tered by Fama-French 48 industry.7 The coefficient on Return implies that an
increase of 10 percentage points in quarterly stock returns is associated with
an increase of 0.41 percentage points in SaleToAst. Given that the average of
SaleToAst is 31.5%, the effect corresponds to an increase of 1.28%. The coef-
ficients on the control variables suggest that the capital expenditure rate and
the cash flow rate are positively correlated with the sales-to-assets ratio, while
the size of the firm and the R&D expense ratio are negatively correlated with
it. As discussed earlier, the OLS estimate is subject to at least three types
of biases. First, there may be omitted variables. For example, the approval
of a new drug by the FDA improves a pharmaceutical company’s sales while
boosting its stock price, which results in an upward bias in the OLS estimate.
Alternatively, when a negative shock hits the firm, the stock price suffers. At
the same time, the manager may lower the product prices in hope to attract
more customers and mitigate the effect of the negative shock on sales. In this
case, the OLS estimate is biased downward. Furthermore, exogenous changes
6All control variables are lagged one period from the dependent variable. SV IF in and
NewsNum are less relevant controls when examining SaleToAst as the outcome variable.
Furthermore, they are only available since 2004. Therefore, I include these two control
variables only in the online customer interest regressions, but not in the sales regressions.
7The results are robust to clustering by firm and double-clustering by firm and time. The
results are available upon request. The industry-level clustering gives more conservative
standard errors.
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in customer interest can directly affect stock returns, leading to reverse causal-
ity concerns. Lastly, some customers may infer a firm’s product quality using
alternative measures that reflect a firm’s stock market performance, such as
valuation ratios or risk-adjusted returns. In this sense, the raw stock return
contains measurement errors, which bias the OLS estimate toward zero (i.e.,
the attenuation bias). In this regression, because the stock price is highly
colinear with the control variables, the attenuation bias could be particularly
severe (Wooldridge (2010), p. 81). Since various endogeneity concerns gen-
erate biases in opposite directions, whether the OLS estimate overstates or
understates the true effect is an empirical question.
To address the endogeneity problems, I rely on the instrumental vari-
able design proposed in Section 3.1.2. The first stage regression in column
(2) suggests that MFFlow is strongly negatively correlated with Return,
consistent with the graphic evidence in Figure 3. The high t-statistic on
MFFlow implies that the instrument is not weak. The second stage coeffi-
cient on Return in column (3) suggests that decreases in stock returns induced
by mutual fund redemptions reduce the firm’s sales. Specifically, a decrease
of 10 percentage points in instrumented Return leads to a decrease of 0.7
percentage points in SaleToAst. The effect represents 2.22% of the average
SaleToAst and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 2SLS effect is
slightly larger in magnitude than the OLS effect. In column (4), I examine the
reduced form regression of SaleToAst on the instrument MFFlow. This spec-
ification gauges the effect of non-fundamental fluctuations in stock prices on
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customer demand and thus more directly tests the comparative statics shown
in Proposition 2. The results suggest that for a one-percentage-point increase
in MFFlow, the sales-to-assets ratio decreases by 0.16 percentage points.
[Insert Table 2 Here.]
Although the sales results are consistent with the story that customers’
purchase decisions are influenced by firms’ stock prices, existing evidence in the
literature also suggests a few alternative explanations. In particular, firms may
change their operations in response to non-fundamental stock price changes
because of managerial learning from stock prices or external financial con-
straints. For example, investment in physical and human capital may de-
crease after MFFlow shocks because managers infer a negative technology
shock based on stock prices or external financing becomes more costly. These
operational changes can lead to subsequent decline in sales. As mentioned in
Section 3.13.1.3, I partially address this concern by examining the changes in
SaleToAst in the quarter concurrent to the MFFlow shocks. The reason is
that most operational changes on the firm’s side take considerable amount of
time to implement. Thus, they are unlikely to affect sales in the contempora-
neous period. Nevertheless, there may still be some short-term changes in the
firm (e.g., depressed morale among sales staff or changes in product pricing)
that could result in lower sales. To further safeguard against these alterna-
tives, I examine a more direct and frequent measure of customer decisions:
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shopping-related Google search volume. The results are shown in the next
subsection.
3.2.2 Effects of Stock Returns on Online Customer Interest
In Table 3, I examine whether negative price pressure induced by mu-
tual fund redemptions leads to lower online customer interest, as proxied by
SV IShop. Control variables are the same as described in Section 3.1.1.8 For
the purpose of comparison, I first examine the OLS regression of SV IShop
on Return. As expected, the coefficient on Return suggests that there is a
robust positive correlation between stock returns and online customer interest.
However, the OLS estimate is subject to endogeneity concerns similar to those
in the sales analysis.
In columns (2) and (3), I estimate the 2SLS regressions in which Return
is instrumented by MFFlow. The first stage coefficient on MFFlow is again
negative and highly statistically significant. The second stage result implies
that when the instrumented monthly stock return drops by 10 percentage
points, the online customer interest declines by 1.51 units. The effect corre-
sponds to 5.27% of the average SV IShop and is statistically significant at the
5% level. The coefficients on the control variables are largely consistent with
intuition. Financial interest, media coverage, firm age, and firm size are pos-
itively correlated with online customer interest. In terms of firm operational
8Control variables are lagged by one period. If the control variable is only available at the
quarterly frequency, the customer interest in month t is matched with the control variable
at the quarter end before month t.
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decisions, higher advertising expense and cost of goods sold ratios are linked
to higher customer interest, as expected. Surprisingly, the R&D expense ratio
is negatively associated with SV IShop. One possible explanation is that R&D
efforts require more than one quarter to materialize into marketable products
that attract customer attention. Firms with recent high R&D spending may
therefore have lower customer interest because they do not have products to
deliver yet. The last two control variables are intended to capture the effects
of financial constraints. As suggested by the coefficients on Leverage and
CashF low in column (3), higher ex-ante measures of financial constraints are
actually associated with higher customer interest in my sample. This observa-
tion seems to be inconsistent with the alternative explanation that the 2SLS
coefficient on Return includes the confounding effects of financial constraints.
In column (4), I directly assess the effect of MFFlow on SV IShop. The re-
sult implies that for a one-percentage-point increase in MFFlow, SV IShop
decreases by 0.15 units.
[Insert Table 3 Here.]
Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that negative price pres-
sure caused by mutual fund redemptions reduces customer demand. The effect
is consistent with the learning mechanisms described in the model. In particu-
lar, customers infer the firm’s product quality from its stock price fluctuations.
When mutual fund redemptions push the firm’s stock price down, customers,
who are unable to distinguish price declines caused by non-fundamental shocks
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from those caused by unfavorable quality shocks, negatively update their as-
sessment of the firm’s products. As shown in the model, these real effects of
noise trader shocks exist only when customers base their purchase decisions
on information extracted from stock prices.
3.2.3 Heterogeneous Effect across Online Financial Interest
A necessary condition for the customer learning mechanism to hold is
that potential customers must be aware of the stock price fluctuations of a
firm. In contrast, the alternative explanations related to changes in firm oper-
ations do not require the same condition. I rely on this distinction to provide
strengthening evidence on the customer learning channel. Specifically, I test
whether the effects of non-fundamental stock price changes on sales and on-
line customer interest are stronger when online financial interest in the firm is
higher.9 To do so, I first add an interaction term between Return and a mea-
sure of financial interest in the second stage regression specified in equation
(3.3). To instrument the additional endogenous variable, I further include the
interaction term between MFFlow and the financial interest measure in the
first stage regression in equation (3.2). Two alternative measures of financial
interest are obtained from Google Trends. The first measure is the SV I on
the Google topic of a given company in the “finance” category (SV IF in).
9In the model, customers essentially have unlimited attention and are able to respond to
every small change in stock price. In reality, however, customers are swamped with various
pieces of information and can only respond to the stock price changes that capture their
attention.
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The second measure is the SV I on the stock ticker of a firm (SV IT ic).10 For
illustration purposes, I construct a dummy variable for whether the financial
interest measure is above the firm-level median and use the dummy variable
in the interaction regression. Based on the customer learning channel, I ex-
pect that after instrumentation, the interaction between Return and the stock
attention measure is positive and statistically significant.
Table 4 shows the results of the interaction regressions. In the first
two columns, the dependent variable is the quarterly sales-to-assets ratio.11
Control variables (untabulated in the table for brevity) are the same as those
used in Table 2. In column (1), the result suggests that if the financial interest
in the firm is below the median (High SV IF in = 0), then a 10-percentage-
point decrease in instrumented Return reduces SaleToAst by 0.54 percentage
points. In contrast, if the financial interest is above median (High SV IF in
= 1), then the same amount of decrease in instrumented Return results in a
reduction of 1.14 percentage points in SaleToAst. In other words, the effect
of non-fundamental stock price changes on the sales-to-assets ratio more than
doubles when the online financial interest in the firm is above the median.
When SV IT ic is used as the proxy for financial interest in column (2), the re-
sults are similar. In the last two columns, I conduct the interaction regression
using SV IShop as the dependent variable, while controlling for the same char-
10Da et al. (2011) and Madsen and Niessner (2016) provide evidence that SV IT ic is a
good proxy for retail investor attention.
11There are fewer observations in the first two columns compared with the sample used
in Table 2 because SV IFIn and SV IT ic are only available since 2004 for a subsample of
firms.
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acteristics as in Table 3.12 The coefficients on the interaction term are again
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that stock price fluctuations
induced by mutual fund redemptions have larger effects on online customer in-
terest when the online financial interest in the firm is higher. In summary, the
results in Table 4 are consistent with the customer learning channel proposed
in my model but difficult to reconcile with alternative theories.
[Insert Table 4 Here.]
3.2.4 Cross-Industry Variations
In this subsection, I run the regressions in columns (1)-(3) of Table
2 using observations in each of the Fama-French 12 industries separately.13
The results are shown in Table 5. There are a few salient observations in
this table. First, when examining the consumer nondurables and durables
industries, the 2SLS coefficient on Return is only statistically significant in the
latter. Previous studies in finance and marketing literatures (e.g., Hortac¸su
et al. (2013) and Hu et al. (2014)) argue that consumer discretion is higher
when considering buying durable goods (e.g., automobiles, appliances, and
furniture), compared with nondurables (e.g., food and apparel). In the context
of my story, when customers observe a lower stock return, they may update
12SV IF in is not included as a control because the dummy variable High SV IFin is
inluded in the regressions.
13I do not tabulate the industry-level regressions using SV IShop as the dependent variable
because the sample size is much smaller. There is limited statistical power after dividing
the sample into Fama-French 12 industries.
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negatively about the firm’s ability to provide warranties and complementary
products in the future. This type of mechanism is more likely to manifest in
the durable goods industry, in which follow-up services are highly valued by
customers. The results in Table 5 are consistent with this expectation. Second,
the instrumented stock return does not have any significant effect on the sales-
to-assets ratio in the energy and chemicals industries, in which products are
commodity-like. In these industries, purchases are more likely to be driven
by convenience or long-term relationships. Therefore, information provided
by financial market prices does not play a significant role. In the rest of the
industries, there are sizable effects of non-fundamental stock price fluctuations
on sales in the industries of business equipment,14 telecommunications, and
shops. In the manufacturing and healthcare industries, the 2SLS effects are
statistically significant but modest in magnitude. It is worth noting that the
power of the first stage regressions are comparable across industries. The
variations in the second stage coefficients on Return are unlikely to be driven
by the fact that some industries are more prone to mutual fund redemption
shocks. Although the analysis in Table 5 is more descriptive than definitive, the
cross-industry variations revealed provide additional support to the view that
the effects of non-fundamental stock price changes on sales operate through
the channel of customer learning from stock prices.
[Insert Table 5 Here.]
14The business equipment industry includes some firms producing consumer electronics,
such as Apple Inc.
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3.2.5 Dynamic Effects
In Table 6, I evaluate the dynamics of the effects of non-fundamental
stock price fluctuations on sales and online customer interest. For illustra-
tion, I use an event study approach. Specifically, I create an event indicator
(Event(t = 0)) for whether MFFlow is above the 90th percentile in a given
period. I also create indicators for the periods before and after an event. In
column (1), I regress SaleToAst on the indicator variables, while controlling
for the same firm characteristics as in Table 2. The coefficient on Event(t = 0)
suggests that SaleToAst decreases by 0.29 percentage points (0.91% of the av-
erage level) during an event quarter, which is statistically significant at the 5%
level. There is no pre-trend in customer interest during the six quarters be-
fore a large MFFlow shock, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on
Event(t = −6) to Event(t = −1). This observation is inconsistent with the
argument that the poor fundamentals of holdings have caused extreme mutual
fund outflows. The absence of a pre-trend suggests that the instrument is
plausibly exogenous. The coefficients on Event(t = 1) to Event(t = 6) sug-
gest that the negative impact of a large MFFlow shock on SaleToAst lasts
for up to four quarters but dissipates afterwards. In the top left graph in Fig-
ure 4, I plot the coefficients on the event indicators (referred to as “abnormal
SaleToAst” in the plot) and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. In
the top right graph, I compare the abnormal SaleToAst with the quarterly
market-adjusted CAAR during the same sample period. The two lines trace
out similar patterns: relatively flat pre-trends and comparable durations of
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impact, consistent with the story that customers negatively update about a
firm’s products when the firm’s stock price is temporarily undervalued due to
mutual fund redemptions.
In the second column of Table 6, I repeat the same analysis using the
online customer interest measure SV IShop as the dependent variable. The
regression coefficients on the event indicators, along with the 95% confidence
intervals, are plotted in the bottom left graph in Figure 4. During the month
of a large MFFlow shock (Event(t = 0)), SV IShop decreases by 0.58 units
(2.04% of the average level). There is no significant decline in SV IShop before
the event month, an observation that alleviates endogeneity concerns. The
effect lasts up to six months after the shock. As shown in the bottom right
graph in Figure 4, the recovery time of SV IShop is again similar to that of
the monthly market-adjusted CAAR.15
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 Here.]
3.2.6 Nearest-Neighbor Matching Analyses
All results presented so far are estimated using linear regression models.
A potential concern is that some observable firm characteristics may affect
customer interest and sales nonlinearly. If the 2SLS regressions fail to fully
control for these nonlinear effects, the estimated coefficient on Return could be
15The monthly market-adjusted CAAR is computed in the same way as in Figure 3.
However, in this graph, the sample period is from 2004 to 2014, and the treatment variable
is determined by the monthly MFFlow measure, as in the online customer interest analysis.
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biased. I address this concern by using a nearest-neighbor matching method.
Specifically, I define the treatment group as those observations with MFFlow
above the 90th percentile in a given period. I then match each observation to
a counterfactual that has the most similar ex-ante observable characteristics
based on the Mahalanobis distance. To further control for firm fixed effects, I
subtract the firm average from each variable before matching.
In Panel A of Table 7, I first run a Logit model to determine the dif-
ferences in ex-ante characteristics between the treated and the control groups.
In the first column, I use the sample of the sales analysis. Because I removed
the firm-level average before matching, the results should be interpreted as
within-firm variations. As shown, the two groups differ in terms of log(Age),
log(MktCap), AdExp, COGS, RDExp, and Leverage. Therefore, I conduct
matching based on these characteristics. The average treatment effect (ATE)
is shown in column (1) of Panel B. The result suggests that a MFFlow shock
in the top decile reduces the SaleToAst by 0.33 percentage points (1.04% of
the average level), an effect statistically significant at the 1% level. To account
for industry trends, I further restrict the match to be within the same Fama-
French 48 industry during the same period. The resulting ATE is slightly
smaller in magnitude but still statistically significant at the 1% level.16 For
comparison, I also present the estimate obtained from a linear regression of
SaleToAst on the treatment variable, while controlling for all characteristics
16The drawback of matching within the same industry and time period is that it results
in larger differences in some of the characteristics after matching.
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listed in the first column of Panel A and the industry-time interacted fixed
effects. The magnitude of the linear model ATE is comparable to the two
matching estimates.
I also repeat the matching algorithm to examine online customer inter-
est. The Logit model in column (2) of Panel A shows that the treatment
and control groups are different along four dimensions: SV IF in, log(1 +
NewsNum), log(Age), and Leverage. After matching based on these charac-
teristics, the ATE suggests that a large MFFlow shock on average reduces the
online customer interest by 0.75 units (2.62% of the average level). The effect
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Restricting the match to within the
same industry and period gives a similar ATE. Overall, the results in Table 7
suggest that my findings are robust to controlling for nonlinear effects through
the nearest-neighbor matching method.
[Insert Table 7 Here.]
3.2.7 Additional Robustness Tests
In this section, I conduct several robustness checks on the main em-
pirical findings that a firm’s sales and shopping-related Google search vol-
ume both decline when the firm’s stock price is negatively impacted by non-
informational mutual fund redemptions. In Panel A of Table 8, I evaluate
whether the sales results hold under alternative specifications. All regressions
are two-stage least squares (2SLS), in which Return or Q is instrumented
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by MFFlow. Control variables (untabulated in the table for brevity) con-
sist of log(Age), log(MktCap), AdExp, COGS, RDExp, CAPX, HHIInd,
Leverage, and CashF low. Return and MFFlow are concurrent to the de-
pendent variable, while controls are lagged by one period. In column (1), I
include the firm-quarter of the year interacted fixed effects to absorb potential
effects of seasonality. In column (2), I include the industry-time interacted
fixed effects to account for the influence of industry trends. The coefficients
on the instrumented Return are positive and statistically significant in both
columns. The magnitudes of these coefficients are also comparable to the 2SLS
estimate shown in Table II (0.0699). Therefore, the sales results are robust to
controlling for the effects of seasonality and industry trends. In column (3), I
cluster the standard errors at the firm level. The resulting t-statistic is greater
than that obtained by clustering the standard errors at the industry level. To
be conservative, I choose to use the industry-level clustering in the other tests.
In column (4), I use the logarithm of sales, rather than the sales-to-
assets ratio, as the dependent variable. For ease of interpretation, I multiply
log(Sales) by 100. The coefficient suggests that, after instrumentation, a
decrease of 10 percentage points in a firm’s quarterly stock return reduces the
firm’s quarterly sales by 3.02%. This effect is quantitatively similar to the
2SLS estimate in Table II, which suggests that a decrease of 10 percentage
points in the instrumented stock return leads to a decrease of 2.22% in the
sales-to-assets ratio, relative to its average level. In column (5), I consider
an alternative measure of stock market valuation - Tobin’s Q. In my sample,
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the mean and standard deviation of Q are 1.77 and 1.26, respectively. In the
regression, I multiply Q by 100 and instrument it with MFFlow. The result
suggests that when the Tobin’s Q decreases by one standard deviation, the
sales-to-assets ratio declines by 6.11 percentage points, which corresponds to
19.4% of its average level.
In Panel B of Table 8, I conduct similar robustness tests on the on-
line customer interest results. Control variables (untabulated in the table for
brevity) include SV IF in (log(1+SV IF in) in column (3)), log(1+NewsNum),
and all controls used in Panel A. The results in columns (1) - (3) suggest
that the negative effects of mutual fund outflow-induced price pressure on a
firm’s shopping-related Google search volume remain significant statistically
and economically after controlling for potential effects of seasonality or in-
dustry trends, or clustering the standard errors at the firm level. The re-
sults in the last two columns show that these effects are also robust to using
log(1 +SV IShop) as the dependent variable or using Q to measure the firm’s
stock market valuation.
[Insert Table 8 Here.]
3.2.8 Alternative Explanations
In the next set of tests, I address the concern that my main findings may
be driven by financial constraints. Previous studies (e.g., Baker et al. (2003)
and Hau and Lai (2013)) find that non-fundamental variations in a firm’s stock
price can affect corporate decisions through the financial constraint channel.
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In particular, poor stock market performance can hamper a firm’s ability to
raise capital, thus adversely impacting its real investment. In the context
of my paper, financial constraints can curtail firms’ spending on marketing
and development of new products and consequently reduce sales and online
customer interest.
Several empirical observations indicate that this alternative explanation
is unlikely to be true. First, I find that the MFFlow shocks have immediate
effects (in the contemporaneous period) on sales and online customer interest.
This pattern is consistent with the customer learning channel, which can occur
instantaneously once customers observe the stock price, while at odds with the
financial constraint channel, which must first affect firms’ capital budgeting
and then customer responses. Second, I directly control for proxies for financial
constraints (i.e., the cash flow rate and the leverage ratio) and firm decisions
that are affected by financial constraints (i.e., the advertising expense ratio,
the R&D expense ratio, and the capital expenditure rate) in the regressions.
Therefore, these variables should be able to absorb the confounding effect, if
any such effect exists.
To completely resolve concerns related to financial constraints, I re-run
the 2SLS regressions on sales and shopping-related Google search volume after
dropping the most financially constrained firms. Table 9 presents the results.
In Panel A, I consider the sales-to-assets ratio as the dependent variable. In
column (1), I use the index proposed in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as a proxy
for financial constraints and remove all observations with index values in the
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top three deciles. As shown, the coefficient on the instrumented Return re-
mains significantly positive and comparable in magnitude to the full-sample
estimate. In column (2), I conduct the same analysis using the financial con-
straint index proposed in Whited and Wu (2006), instead. The result is again
similar to the full-sample estimate.
Another confounding effect related to the financial health of the firm
is that large mutual fund flow shocks may coincide with episodes of financial
distress. If customers know that the firm is financially distressed from infor-
mation sources other than the stock price, their demand for the firm’s product
may decline. However, this is not due to the learning channel proposed in
this paper. To alleviate this concern, I drop observations with Altman (1968)
z-scores in the bottom three deciles. The result is shown in column (3). Since
the coefficient on Return is actually greater than the full-sample estimate, my
main finding is unlikely to be driven by financial distress.
In column (4), I address concerns related to recessions. There are two
reasons why recessions could potentially affect the interpretation of my main
results. First, financial constraints are especially severe for firms during reces-
sionary periods. Second, mutual funds flows and customer demand are both
likely to be lower during recessions, posing a challenge to the identification
strategy. Since I include time fixed effects in all regressions, the effects of
recessions should be mostly removed. To further safeguard against this con-
cern, I exclude all NBER recessionary periods from the sample and re-run
the 2SLS regression. The coefficient on Return in column (4) is similar to
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the estimate obtained without excluding the recessionary periods, suggesting
that the negative effects of outflow-induced price pressure on sales are not com-
pletely explained by recessions. In Panel B, I repeat the same set of tests using
SV IShop as the dependent variable and, again, find no evidence suggesting
that my main findings are entirely driven by alternative explanations.
[Insert Table 9 Here.]
3.3 Firm Response to Customer Learning: Product Launch
Decisions
The empirical evidence shown so far has established the mechanism
that customers extract information from stock prices to guide their demand
for a firm’s products. In this section, I assess whether firms respond to this
type of learning by adjusting the timing of their product launches. As implied
in Corollary 1 of the model, if the manager of the firm is aware of the effect of
stock market performance on customer demand, she should avoid announcing
new products when the firm’s stock return is lower.
3.3.1 Data on Product Launches
I obtain press release data from RavenPack News Analytics to mea-
sure firms’ decisions to launch new products. RavenPack adopts proprietary
algorithms to classify firms’ press releases into detailed categories, including
mergers and acquisitions, pollution, industrial accidents, executive changes,
and product releases. I obtain over 100,000 press releases for new products
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and services during the sample period 2004-2014. The press release dataset is
merged with other firm characteristics based on historical CUSIP. More details
about the selection criteria of the RavenPack sample are given in the appen-
dices. In the regression analysis, I focus on the dummy variable for whether
there is any press release on new products and services during a given month,
rather than the number of such press releases, because the dummy variable is
unlikely to be affected by multiple sources reporting on the same event. The
summary statistics of the sample used in the product launch analysis are pro-
vided in Panel D of Table 1. On average, the probability of a product launch
in a given month is 9.75%.
Compared to traditional measures of investments, such as capital ex-
penditures and R&D expenses reported in Compustat, examining press re-
leases of new products and services has several advantages. First, the decision
to release new products is more dependent on customer demand and thus
more suitable for testing the customer learning channel emphasized in the
model. Furthermore, analyzing product release decisions while controlling for
investments in physical capital and R&D helps to address alternative concerns
related to managerial learning from stock prices and financial constraints.
3.3.2 Effects of Stock Returns on Product Launch Probability
I test the implication of Corollary 1 that firms are less likely to launch
new products when their stock prices decrease due to non-fundamental shocks
using an empirical design similar to that in the customer demand tests. The
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first stage is the same as in equation (3.2). The second stage is as follows:
ProdLauDumit = β
′
rR̂eturnit + β
′
cControlsit−1 + ν
′
it, (3.4)
where ProdLauDum is the dummy variable for whether there is a product
launch in a given month. Controls are the same as those in Table 2. Based on
Corollary 1, I expect β′r to be positive and statistically significant.
In column (1) of Table 10, I first examine the OLS regression for com-
parison. The result suggests that a 10-percentage-point decrease in the firm’s
stock return is associated with a 0.2-percentage-point decrease in the prob-
ability of a product launch. To address the endogeneity of stock returns, I
next present estimates from the 2SLS regressions in columns (2) and (3). The
results suggest that when the firm’s stock return decreases by 10 percentage
points, the monthly probability of product launches decreases by 0.89 percent-
age points, an effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Given the
summary statistics in Panel D of Table 1, the effect is 9.09% of the uncondi-
tional monthly launch probability. In the last column, I regress ProdLauDum
on the instrument MFFlow directly. The reduced form estimate suggests that
when MFFlow increases by one percentage point, the probability of a product
launch decreases by 0.083 percentage points. Overall, the results in Table 10
support the prediction of Corollary 1 that in anticipation of depressed cus-
tomer demand, the manager of the firm is less willing to launch a new product
when non-fundamental shocks lower the firm’s stock price.
[Insert Table 10 Here.]
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3.4 Conclusion
This paper investigates whether and how stock price movements affect
customer purchase decisions. Using novel data and an instrumental variable
design, I present evidence that sales and online customer interest (as prox-
ied by shopping-related Google searches) decline when a firm’s stock return is
negatively impacted by non-informational mutual fund redemptions. These ef-
fects are stronger when more potential customers are aware of the firm’s stock
price. Furthermore, firm managers seem to incorporate the negative effect of
poor stock market performance on customer demand in their decision making
process. Specifically, mutual fund outflow-induced price pressure lowers the
probability of product launches. These findings are consistent with a rational
expectations model in which customer learning from stock prices leads to feed-
back effects from the financial market to firms’ cash flows and product launch
decisions.
This paper is the first to provide direct evidence that customers extract
information from stock prices to facilitate their purchase decisions. The real
effects of this channel on firms are substantial. Based on my instrumental vari-
able regression estimate, a firm with the median level of total assets (roughly
$250 million) loses $1.75 million of sales in the contemporaneous quarter when
its quarterly stock return decreases by 10 percentage points. Furthermore, the
loss in sales continues for up to four quarters after the initial shock. From the
perspective of a corporate executive, my results suggest that it is important
to pay attention to the firm’s stock price, since temporary underpricing can
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affect the firm’s fundamentals by influencing potential customers’ perception
of the firm’s product quality. Policy makers should also be aware that shocks
originated in financial markets can have disruptive effects in the real economy
because non-financial decision makers, such as customers, base their decisions
on information revealed in stock prices.
While the goal of this paper is to test for the existence of customer
learning from stock prices, a few interesting questions related to this mech-
anism remain unanswered. First, when the stock returns of a firm decline,
disappointed customers may switch to close competitors whose stocks have
not performed poorly, which results in increases in the competitors’ sales. Fur-
thermore, knowing this effect, competitors may also respond by changing their
product market strategies. Studying these interactions in the product market
can further gauge the economic significance of customer learning from stock
prices. Second, the interplay of learning by customers and speculators could
potentially explain puzzling observations in financial markets. For instance,
Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) demonstrate theoretically that when the
stakeholders of a firm learn from its stock price, the complementarities across
these stakeholders can lead to cascades in the firm’s stock price, as well as fun-
damental value. Goldstein et al. (2013) propose a model that explains trading
frenzies using feedback effects induced by real decision makers learning from
stock prices. Empirical research testing the predictions of these models can
help us understand the role of learning in connecting financial markets and
the real economy.
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Figure 1: Volatility of the Stock Price
This figure plots the volatility of the stock price given different parameter
values. Specifically, a is the coefficient of risk aversion; vz is the prior variance
of the quality shock; vx is the variance of the noise trader shock; vη is the
variance of the customer’s private signal. Price volatility V [p] is defined in
equation (2.8).
a = 2
vz = 2
a = 4
vz = 2
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Figure 1 continued
a = 2
vz = 0.4
a = 2
vz = 4
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Figure 2: Online Customer Interest for Apple Inc.
This figure demonstrates the process used to collect the measure of online customer interest
(SVIShop) for Apple Inc. from Google Trends. The top image shows the topics suggested
by Google Trends when the term “apple” is used as the search input. The bottom image
shows some available categories in Google Trends. The automated script collects the search
volume index on the topic labeled as “technology company” in the “shopping” category.
Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends)
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Figure 3: Effects of Large Mutual Fund Redemption Shocks on Stock
Returns
This figure shows the monthly cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) around large
mutual fund redemption shocks (i.e., MFFlow is above the 90th percentile of the quar-
ter) and the corresponding quarterly MFFlow. To avoid discretionary trading by the fund
managers, MFFlow is computed by assuming that the distress funds sell their existing hold-
ings proportionally to ex-ante portfolio weights. More details regarding the construction of
MFFlow is provided in Section 3.13.1.2. Abnormal returns are computed using three dif-
ferent benchmarks: the CRSP equal-weighted index (red), the Fama-French equal-weighted
48 industry portfolios (blue), and the characteristic-matched portfolios proposed in Daniel
et al. (1997) (green). The sample period is 1980-2014.
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Figure 4: Effects of Large Mutual Fund Redemption Shocks on
Sales and Online Customer Interest
This figure plots the abnormal sales-to-assets ratios (SaleToAst) and shopping-related on-
line search volume indices (SV IShop) around large mutual fund redemption shocks (i.e.,
MFFlow is above the 90th percentile of the period). Abnormal SaleToAst and SV IShop
are the coefficients on the event indicators estimated using regressions in Table 6. The two
graphs on the left show the abnormal SaleToAst and SV IShop, along with their respective
95% confidence intervals. The two graphs on the right contrast the abnormal SaleToAst
and SV IShop with the corresponding market-adjusted cumulative average abnormal stock
returns (CAAR) during the same periods. The sample period for the sales analysis is 1980-
2014, while that for the online search volume analysis is 2004-2014. The CAAR plots appear
to be different mainly because of the two different sample periods.
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Figure 4 continued
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Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Panel A. Variable Definitions
Variables from Compustat:
SaleToAst sales-to-assets ratio (i.e., asset turnover) = sales/lagged
book assets
AdExp advertising expense ratio = advertising expenses/sales; zero
if missing
COGS cost of goods sold ratio = cost of goods sold/sales
RDExp R&D expense ratio = R&D expenses/sales; zero if missing
CAPX capital expenditure rate = capital expenditures/lagged book
assets
HHIInd industry concentration = sales Herfindahl index of the
Fama-French 48 industry
Leverage leverage ratio = (long-term debt + debt in current liabilities
- cash and short-term investments)/book assets
CashFlow cash flow rate = (income before extraordinary items + de-
preciation and amortization)/lagged assets
Variables from CRSP:
Return stock return (monthly or quarterly, depending on the spec-
ifications)
Age age of the firm = number of years since first appearing in
CRSP
MktCap market capitalization = price × total number of shares out-
standing
Variables from Google Trends:
SVIShop Google search volume index on the Google topic of a given
company in the category “shopping”
SVIFin Google search volume index on the Google topic of a given
company in the category “finance”
SVITic Google search volume index on the stock ticker of a given
company
Variables from RavenPack News Analytics:
NewsNum number of news reports
ProdLauDum dummy variable for whether there is a press release on new
products or services
ProdLauNum number of press releases on new products or services
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Table 1 continued
Panel B. Summary Statistics for Sales Regressions
(Quarterly Data; Sample Period: 1980-2014)
Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
SaleToAst (%) 31.52 21.29 8.984 16.97 27.56 40.42 58.06
Age (years) 15.96 15.73 1.750 4.500 11.25 21.75 36.25
MktCap (million $) 2,351 12,790 26.07 64.99 227.3 919.0 3,428
AdExp (%) 1.176 2.866 0 0 0 1.018 3.570
COGS (%) 74.24 78.22 32.98 50.32 66.49 78.99 89.22
RDExp (%) 12.56 57.17 0 0 0 4.289 17.31
CAPX (%) 1.628 2.057 0.0841 0.396 0.963 2.010 3.816
HHIInd 0.0874 0.0769 0.0363 0.0436 0.0613 0.0984 0.173
Leverage (%) 3.395 33.06 -44.60 -16.85 8.927 27.48 41.35
CashFlow (%) 1.730 3.901 -1.954 0.960 2.277 3.605 5.122
Return (quarterly %) 3.255 25.98 -26.53 -11.76 1.653 15.75 33.25
MFFlow (quarterly %) 0.336 0.871 0 0 0.0289 0.256 0.839
No. of Firms 10,017
No. of Obs. 311,368
Panel C. Summary Statistics for Online Customer Interest Regressions
(Monthly Data; Sample Period: 2004-2014)
Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
SVIShop 28.66 23.11 3 10 23 43 62
SVIFin 23.36 22.78 0 5 17 36 57
SVITic 35.33 25.31 0 14 35 55 70
NewsNum 19.46 33.27 1 5 11 22 41
Return (monthly %) 1.108 13.36 -12.86 -5.501 0.845 7.126 14.69
MFFlow (monthly %) 0.796 4.713 0.0127 0.0975 0.306 0.788 1.761
No. of Firms 2,133
No. of Obs. 167,895
Panel D. Summary Statistics for Product Launch Regressions
(Monthly Data; Sample Period: 2004-2014)
Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
ProdLauDum 0.0975 0.297 0 0 0 0 0
ProdLauNum 0.199 0.784 0 0 0 0 0
No. of Firms 4,318
No. of Obs. 299,521
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Table 2: Effects of Stock Returns on Sales
This table examines whether the sales-to-assets ratio decreases when the stock
return of the firm is lower. The unit of observation is firm-quarter. I present
the t-statistics in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by industry.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS Reduced Form
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable SaleToAst Return SaleToAst SaleToAst
Return 0.0405*** 0.0699***
(13.88) (4.833)
MFFlow -2.296*** -0.161***
(-15.13) (-4.466)
log(Age) 0.172 0.602** 0.157 0.199
(0.387) (2.428) (0.355) (0.447)
log(MktCap) -0.818*** -7.360*** -0.601*** -1.115***
(-4.229) (-20.82) (-2.819) (-5.404)
AdExp -0.0401 -0.0620* -0.0383 -0.0426
(-0.808) (-1.831) (-0.772) (-0.857)
COGS 0.00684 -0.00884*** 0.00711 0.00649
(1.325) (-5.444) (1.381) (1.252)
RDExp -0.0204** 0.0172*** -0.0209** -0.0197**
(-2.460) (5.871) (-2.527) (-2.369)
CAPX 0.383*** -0.157*** 0.388*** 0.377***
(5.024) (-3.324) (5.006) (5.026)
HHIInd -1.018 -0.114 -1.018 -1.026
(-0.863) (-0.0635) (-0.874) (-0.852)
Leverage 0.00270 -0.0516*** 0.00419 0.000581
(0.287) (-6.849) (0.435) (0.0611)
CashFlow 0.564*** 0.927*** 0.537*** 0.602***
(10.34) (17.69) (9.948) (10.80)
Observations 311,368 311,368 311,368 311,368
R-squared 0.823 0.274 0.822 0.821
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
64
Table 3: Effects of Stock Returns on Online Customer Interest
This table examines whether the online customer interest, as measured by
SV IShop, decreases when the stock return of the firm is lower. The unit
of observation is firm-month. I present the t-statistics in the parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS Reduced Form
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable SVIShop Return SVIShop SVIShop
Return 0.0374*** 0.151**
(5.660) (2.175)
MFFlow -0.983*** -0.148**
(-20.42) (-2.126)
SVIFin 0.119*** 0.000645 0.120*** 0.120***
(6.993) (0.403) (6.994) (7.004)
log(1+NewsNum) 0.300*** 0.541*** 0.250** 0.331***
(3.369) (11.11) (2.209) (3.541)
log(Age) 4.538*** 0.445 4.468*** 4.540***
(5.368) (1.196) (5.233) (5.362)
log(MktCap) 3.433*** -3.687*** 3.871*** 3.309***
(8.648) (-26.02) (8.534) (8.143)
AdExp 0.249*** 0.00444 0.250** 0.250***
(2.726) (0.183) (2.700) (2.743)
COGS 0.0118*** -0.00349* 0.0123*** 0.0118***
(3.313) (-1.720) (3.439) (3.297)
RDExp -0.0120*** 0.00156 -0.0122*** -0.0121***
(-3.260) (0.610) (-3.136) (-3.261)
CAPX -0.176 -0.175*** -0.152 -0.183
(-1.021) (-4.141) (-0.870) (-1.067)
HHIInd 12.77 1.271 12.53 12.70
(0.801) (0.635) (0.783) (0.797)
Leverage 0.0323* -0.0201*** 0.0353** 0.0321*
(1.974) (-4.677) (2.150) (1.971)
CashFlow -0.0451 0.275*** -0.0824* -0.0447
(-1.089) (15.36) (-1.737) (-1.177)
Observations 167,895 167,895 167,895 167,895
R-squared 0.508 0.252 0.503 0.507
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects across Online Financial Interest
This table examines the heterogeneity in the effects of stock returns on sales
(columns (1) and (2)) and online customer interest (columns (3) and (4))
across different levels of online financial interest. The unit of observation
is firm-quarter in the first two columns and firm-month in the last two. The
regressions are estimated using the 2SLS method, in which Return and Return
× High X are instrumented by MFFlow and MFFlow × High X, where the
variable High X denotes an indicator for whether characteristic X is above
the firm-level median. Other control variables (untabulated in the table for
brevity) are the same as those in Table 2 in the first two columns, and Table
3 (except for SV IF in) in the last two columns. There are fewer observations
in the first two columns compared with those in Table 2 because SV IF in
and SV IT ic are only available since 2004 for a subsample of firms. I present
the t-statistics in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by industry.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Interest SVIFin SVITic SVIFin SVITic
Proxy
Dependent Variable SaleToAst SaleToAst SVIShop SVIShop
Return 0.0540** 0.0705** 0.0661 0.137***
(2.078) (2.405) (0.762) (2.664)
Return × High SVIFin 0.0601** 0.277***
(2.302) (2.903)
High SVIFin -0.0747 3.106***
(-0.661) (6.370)
Return × High SVITic 0.0437* 0.148**
(1.658) (2.262)
High SVITic 0.209* 0.726***
(1.960) (7.305)
Observations 60,013 60,013 167,895 167,895
R-squared 0.882 0.883 0.495 0.492
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
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Table 6: Dynamic Effects of Large Mutual Fund Redemption Shocks on
Sales and Online Customer Interest
This table examines the effects of large mutual fund redemption shocks on sales and online customer interest.
Event(t = 0) is an indicator variable for whether MFFlow is above the 90th percentile of the period.
Indicator variables are also created for the periods before and after an event (Event(t = −9)-Event(t = 9)).
The unit of observation is firm-quarter in the first column and firm-month in the second. Control variables
(untabulated in the table for brevity) are the same as those in Table 2 in column (1), and Table 3 in column
(2). The numbers of observations are fewer because regressions in this table require non-missing values for
lead and lag terms of MFFlow. I present the t-statistics in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered
by industry. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Sales (Quarterly) Online Customer Interest (Monthly)
Dependent Variable SaleToAst SVIShop
Event(t = -9) -0.214
(-0.796)
Event(t = -8) -0.402
(-1.201)
Event(t = -7) -0.324
(-1.107)
Event(t = -6) -0.139 -0.403
(-1.095) (-1.248)
Event(t = -5) -0.0884 -0.237
(-0.725) (-0.760)
Event(t = -4) -0.0320 -0.529
(-0.248) (-1.523)
Event(t = -3) -0.121 -0.229
(-0.938) (-0.800)
Event(t = -2) -0.0907 -0.0286
(-0.711) (-0.0919)
Event(t = -1) -0.0381 0.00861
(-0.372) (0.0287)
Event(t = 0) -0.286** -0.584**
(-2.386) (-2.178)
Event(t = 1) -0.290** -0.719**
(-2.600) (-2.546)
Event(t = 2) -0.214** -0.632**
(-2.026) (-2.113)
Event(t = 3) -0.219** -0.473*
(-2.255) (-1.714)
Event(t = 4) -0.147* -0.819***
(-1.706) (-2.664)
Event(t = 5) -0.143 -0.393
(-1.529) (-1.278)
Event(t = 6) -0.109 -0.590*
(-1.627) (-1.765)
Event(t = 7) -0.236
(-0.863)
Event(t = 8) -0.174
(-0.523)
Event(t = 9) -0.268
(-0.843)
Observations 281,357 154,552
R-squared 0.827 0.493
Controls YES YES
Firm FE YES YES
Time FE YES YES
69
Table 7: Nearest-Neighbor Matching Analyses
This table shows the results from the nearest-neighbor matching analyses. The treatment group consists
of observations with MFFlow above the 90th percentile of the period. In Panel A, I first examine a Logit
model to determine the differences in observable ex-ante characteristics between the treated and control
groups. The characteristics with statistically significant coefficients are used as matching criteria. In the
first row of Panel B, I report the average treatment effect (ATE) obtained from matching each observation
with a counterfactual that has the most similar characteristics based on the Mahalanobis distance. In the
second row, I further require the match to be within the same industry and period. In the third row, I
report the ATE obtained from a linear regression of SaleToAst or SV IShop on the treatment variable, the
firm characteristics specified in Panel A, and the industry-time interacted fixed effects. To account for firm
fixed effects, I remove the firm average from each variable before the matching analysis. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Logit Model to Determine Differences in Observable Characteristics
Dependent variable: whether the demeaned MFFlow is above the 90th percentile of the period
Demeaned characteristics Sales Sample Online Customer Interest Sample
SVIFin -0.00237***
(-3.567)
log(1+NewsNum) -0.215***
(-16.19)
log(Age) 0.171*** 0.365***
(10.13) (7.686)
log(MktCap) 0.0755*** -0.0293
(7.930) (-1.281)
AdExp -0.0101** -0.00695
(-2.135) (-0.898)
COGS 0.000533*** 0.000365
(2.809) (0.667)
RDExp -0.000962*** 0.000235
(-3.216) (0.349)
CAPX 0.00363 -0.00765
(0.764) (-0.586)
HHIInd -0.0965 0.331
(-0.584) (0.312)
Leverage -0.00338*** -0.00503***
(-7.358) (-5.605)
CashFlow -0.00235 -0.00177
(-1.018) (-0.442)
Panel B. Average Treatment Effects
Treatment group: the demeaned MFFlow is above the 90th percentile of the period
Dependent Variable SaleToAst SVIShop
Match based on characteristics -0.329*** -0.750***
(-4.851) (-3.732)
Match based on characteristics -0.194*** -0.625***
within the same industry and period (-2.700) (-3.027)
Linear model -0.279*** -0.870***
(-3.585) (-4.180)
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Table 8: Robustness Tests
This table examines whether the main empirical results shown in the paper are robust
to alternative specifications. All regressions are 2SLS, in which Return or Q is instru-
mented by MFFlow. In Panel A, the unit of observation is firm-quarter. Control variables
(untabulated in the table for brevity) include log(Age), log(MktCap), AdExp, COGS,
RDExp, CAPX, HHIInd, Leverage, and CashF low. In Panel B, the unit of observation
is firm-month. Control variables (untabulated in the table for brevity) include SV IF in
(log(1 + SV IF in) in column (3)), log(1 + NewsNum), and all controls used in Panel A.
Return and MFFlow are concurrent to the dependent variable, while control variables are
lagged by one period. log(Sales), Q, and log(1+SV IShop) are multiplied by 100 for ease of
interpretation. I present the t-statistics in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Sales Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable SaleToAst SaleToAst SaleToAst log(Sales) SaleToAst
Return 0.0844*** 0.0597*** 0.0699*** 0.302***
(5.286) (3.405) (5.516) (4.342)
Q 0.0485***
(5.246)
Observations 311,368 311,368 311,368 311,368 311,368
R-squared 0.850 0.833 0.822 0.960 0.825
Firm FE SUBSUMED YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES SUBSUMED YES YES YES
Firm × QofY FE YES NO NO NO NO
Ind × Time FE NO YES NO NO NO
SE Cluster Industry Industry Firm Industry Industry
Panel B. Online Customer Interest Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable SVIShop SVIShop SVIShop log(SVIShop) SVIShop
Return 0.207*** 0.129* 0.151** 0.464**
(3.006) (1.870) (2.403) (2.017)
Q 0.0977**
(2.283)
Observations 167,895 167,895 167,895 167,895 167,895
R-squared 0.544 0.524 0.503 0.445 0.440
Firm FE SUBSUMED YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES SUBSUMED YES YES YES
Firm × MofY FE YES NO NO NO NO
Ind × Time FE NO YES NO NO NO
SE Cluster Industry Industry Firm Industry Industry
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Table 9: Alternative Explanations
This table examines whether the effects of stock returns on sales (Panel A) and online cus-
tomer interest (Panel B) hold after removing the most financially constrained or distressed
firms, or recessionary periods. The unit of observation is firm-quarter in Panel A and
firm-month in Panel B. All regressions are estimated using the 2SLS method. In the first
column, I use the financial constraint index proposed in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and re-
move observations with index values in the top three deciles. In the second column, I use the
financial constraint index proposed in Whited and Wu (2006) and remove observations with
index values in the top three deciles. In the third column, I use the z-score for financial dis-
tress proposed in Altman (1968) and remove observations with z-score values in the bottom
three deciles. In the last column, I remove NBER recessionary periods. Return is instru-
mented by MFFlow. In Panel A, control variables (untabulated in the table for brevity)
include log(Age), log(MktCap), AdExp, COGS, RDExp, CAPX, HHIInd, Leverage,
and CashF low. In Panel B, control variables include SV IF in, log(1 + NewsNum), and
all controls used in Panel A. I present the t-statistics in the parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered by industry. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Sales Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Exclusion High KZ High WW Low A-z Recession
Dependent Variable SaleToAst SaleToAst SaleToAst SaleToAst
Return 0.0848*** 0.0463*** 0.0925*** 0.0705***
(5.101) (4.067) (6.211) (4.141)
Observations 217,594 217,489 217,634 270,075
R-squared 0.834 0.847 0.839 0.822
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Panel B. Online Customer Interest Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Exclusion High KZ High WW Low A-z Recession
Dependent Variable SVIShop SVIShop SVIShop SVIShop
Return 0.141** 0.154* 0.319*** 0.200**
(2.092) (1.951) (3.901) (2.355)
Observations 115,713 115,711 115,703 140,197
R-squared 0.521 0.536 0.496 0.492
Controls YES YES YES YES
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
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Table 10: Effects of Stock Returns on Product Launch Probability
This table examines whether firms are less likely to launch new products when
their stock returns are lower. The unit of observation is firm-month. I present
the t-statistics in the parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by industry.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. The coefficients are multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS Reduced Form
1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Variable
Prod-
LauDum
Return
Prod-
LauDum
ProdLauDum
Return 0.0197*** 0.0886**
(4.329) (2.247)
MFFlow -0.937*** -0.0830**
(-18.29) (-2.285)
log(Age) 6.527*** 0.118 6.519*** 6.530***
(3.904) (0.638) (3.915) (3.897)
log(MktCap) 0.811*** -3.753*** 1.071*** 0.738***
(3.247) (-25.89) (3.946) (3.043)
AdExp -0.0182 -0.00485 -0.0178 -0.0182
(-0.309) (-0.259) (-0.298) (-0.308)
COGS -0.000703 -0.00220*** -0.000555 -0.000750
(-0.984) (-4.045) (-0.754) (-1.061)
RDExp 0.00256** 0.00445*** 0.00225* 0.00265**
(2.214) (4.771) (1.962) (2.300)
CAPX 0.0497 -0.114*** 0.0570 0.0468
(1.087) (-4.144) (1.215) (1.033)
Leverage 0.0277*** -0.0197*** 0.0289*** 0.0272***
(3.141) (-4.899) (3.189) (3.104)
CashFlow -0.0302 0.305*** -0.0515* -0.0245
(-1.341) (13.88) (-1.955) (-1.119)
HHIInd 8.850** -0.634 8.861** 8.805**
(2.337) (-0.344) (2.319) (2.329)
Observations 299,521 299,521 299,521 299,521
R-squared 0.305 0.227 0.304 0.305
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
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Appendix A
Proofs
1 Proof of Proposition 1
I use a guess-and-verify method to solve for the stock prices. Suppose
that p = A + Bz + Cx, for some constants A, B, and C. The signal on z
derived from p is ζ = p−A
B
= z + C
B
x. Substituting the equations in (2.4) into
the optimal demand for the firm’s stock in equation (2.3) and using the market
clearing condition (2.5) lead to the following expression for p:
p =
v−1z z¯ + v
−1
ζ ζ + v
−1
η z
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
− av
−1
η (x¯+ x)
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
. (1.1)
A, B, and C are solved by matching coefficients:
A =
v−1z z¯
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
− av
−1
η x¯
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
; (1.2)
B =
v−1ζ + v
−1
η
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
; (1.3)
C =
v−1ζ
C
B
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
− av
−1
η
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
. (1.4)
Dividing C by B and simplifying give
C
B
= − a
v−1z + v−1η + v
−1
ζ
. (1.5)
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Substituting equation (1.5) into equation (1.4) gives
C = − a(v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
(v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η )
2
. (1.6)
Note that
vζ = (
C
B
)2vx. (1.7)
Substituting equation (1.7) into equation (1.5) and rearranging suggest that
C
B
solves the following quadratic equation:
(v−1z + v
−1
η )
(C
B
)2
+ a
C
B
+ v−1x = 0. (1.8)
I restrict attention to the set of parameters for which the solution to equation
(1.8) exists, that is, a2 − 4(v−1z + v−1η )v−1x ≥ 0. Hence,
C1
B1
=
−a+
√
a2 − 4(v−1z + v−1η )v−1x
2(v−1z + v−1η )
; (1.9)
or
C2
B2
=
−a−
√
a2 − 4(v−1z + v−1η )v−1x
2(v−1z + v−1η )
. (1.10)
Substituting equation (1.9) or (1.10) back into equation (1.7) gives vζ .
2 Proof of Proposition 2 and the Model without Cus-
tomer Learning from Stock Prices
Substituting ζ = z + C
B
x into equation (2.2) gives
f =
v−1z z¯ + v
−1
η η
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
+
v−1ζ
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
(z +
C
B
x). (2.1)
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In both linear equilibria,
∂f
∂x
=
v−1ζ
v−1z + v−1η + v
−1
ζ
C
B
= −a−1v−1x < 0. (2.2)
Therefore, Proposition 2 holds.
If the customer does not use the signal derived from the stock price,
then the firm’s cash flow becomes
f ′ =
v−1z z¯ + v
−1
η η
v−1z + v−1η
=
v−1z z¯ + v
−1
η (z + η)
v−1z + v−1η
. (2.3)
The speculators’ conditional expectation and variance of f ′ are
E[f ′|z] = v
−1
z z¯ + v
−1
η z
v−1z + v−1η
; V [f ′|z] = v
−1
η
(v−1z + v−1η )2
. (2.4)
Substituting equations in (2.4) into the optimal stock demand in equation
(2.3) and using the market clearing condition (2.5) give the following solution
of p′:
p′ =
v−1η
v−1z + v−1η
z − av
−1
η
(v−1z + v−1η )2
x+
v−1z z¯
v−1z + v−1η
− av
−1
η x¯
(v−1z + v−1η )2
. (2.5)
When the customer does not learn from the stock price, there is a unique
linear equilibrium. The customer demand (i.e., the firm’s cash flow) is still
correlated with the stock price because z enters both f ′ and p′. However,
f ′ does not depend on the noise trader shock x. Hence, the prediction that
customer demand decreases in the noisy supply of the firm’s stock only holds
in a model with customer learning from stock prices.
77
3 Proof of Corollary 1
Equation (2.6) can be rewritten as
Prob[L = 1] =

0 if E[g|z] <
¯
k;
v−1z z¯+v−1η z+v−1ζ ζ
(k¯−
¯
k)(v−1z +v−1ζ +v
−1
η )
− ¯k
k¯−
¯
k
if
¯
k ≤ E[g|z] < k¯;
1 if E[g|z] ≥ k¯.
(3.1)
In both linear equilibria,
∂Prob[L = 1]
∂x
=

v−1ζ
C
B
(k¯−
¯
k)(v−1z +v−1ζ +v
−1
η )
= −a−1v−1x (k¯ − ¯k)
−1 < 0 if
¯
k ≤ E[g|z] < k¯;
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
Therefore, Corollary 1 holds.
4 Proof of Proposition 3
The unconditional variance of E[g|z] can be expressed as
V [E[g|z]] =
( v−1η
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
)2
vz +
( v−1ζ
v−1z + v
−1
ζ + v
−1
η
)2
(vζ + vz). (4.1)
Let V1[E[g|z]] denote the variance obtained by substituting equation (1.9) into
(4.1), and V2[E[g|z]] denote that obtained by substituting equation (1.10) into
equation (4.1).
V1[E[g|z]]− V2[E[g|z]] =
vηvz(vη + 2vz)
√
a2 − 4(v−1z + v−1η )v−1x
a(vη + vz)2
> 0 (4.2)
Therefore, this variance is greater in equilibrium 1 (i.e., the one characterized
in equation (1.9)). The ex ante expected net cash flow of the product launch
is given in equation (2.7). This quantity is increasing in V [E[g|z]] given that
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E[g|z] is normally distributed. Furthermore, the unconditional mean of E[g|z]
is z¯ in both equilibria. Thus, the ex ante expected cash flow is greater in
equilibrium 1.
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Appendix B
Data Details
1 Google Trends Data Collection
I use an automated script to collect the search volume indexes (SVI)
from Google Trends. To capture the online customer interest in a company,
I obtain the SVI on the Google topic of a given company in the category
“shopping”. Specifically, I first remove all commonly used words (e.g., “inc”,
“corp”, “co”, and “group”) from the company names reported in Compustat.
Next, I use the stripped company names as search inputs to collect all topics
suggested by Google and select topics categorized as “company”, “business
operation”, “corporation”, or words with similar meanings. I keep the first
topic when more than one company-level topics are available (usually due to
redundant topics or subsidiaries). Lastly, all downloads are manually checked
to ensure that the company names and Google topics are correctly matched.
Some company names are not linked to Google search topics. When a search
topic is unavailable, I collect the SVI using the stripped company name as the
input. In the regression sample, 89.9% of the observations are obtained using
the topic report function. To identify the customer interest separately from
other types of interest, I restrict the index to the category “shopping”.
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There are some caveats regarding the Google Trends data. First, Google
Trends does not report the actual search frequencies, but rather provide an
index scaled between 0 and 100. Within each download, the data point that
has the highest (lowest) actual search frequency is assigned with an index
value of 100 (0). The problem with this data structure is that the index values
across different downloads are not comparable. Since I download the index for
each firm separately, firm fixed effects are included in all regressions to address
this problem. The second caveat is that to increase response speed, Google
Trends does not use all historical search data in Google’s system to compute
the SVIs. Instead, a random representative sample is used. These sampling
errors add noise to my estimation, but are unlikely to cause any directional
biases. Lastly, the SVI from Google Trends are bottom-coded. Specifically,
if the search volume is below a certain threshold, the index value is coded
as zero. I require each sample firm to have at least 60% non-zero monthly
observations during my sample period to be included in the regression analy-
sis. Da et al. (2011) imposes a similar restriction in their study. In the final
sample, a valid shopping-related search volume index is available for 52% of
the firm-month observations that have non-missing values for all CRSP and
Compustat variables required in the main regressions.
2 Construction of the Instrument MFFlow
Mutual fund holdings data are obtained from Thomson Reuters mutual
fund common stock holdings database. Following Coval and Stafford (2007),
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I exclude funds with the following Investment Objective Codes: international,
municipal bonds, bond and preferred, or metals. Data on mutual fund returns
and assets under management are from CRSP survivor-bias-free US mutual
fund database. I use the investment style variables in CRSP to identify sector
funds and exclude them from the analysis. Specifically, I remove funds with
Lipper classification codes AU, H, FS, NR, RE, TK, UT, CG, CMD, CS, ID,
BM, or TL, or Strategic Insight codes GLD, HLT, FIN, NTR, RLE, TEC,
UTI, or SEC, or Wiesenberger objective codes GPM, HLT, FIN, ENR, TCH,
or UTL. The CRSP mutual fund database and the Thomson Reuters holdings
database are merged using MFLINKS constructed in Wermers (2000). Data
on stock prices and trading volume are from CRSP monthly stock files.
To construct MFFlow, I first identify funds that experience extreme
outflows in the previous period. The percentage flow of the fund f in period
t is
Flowf,t =
TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 + rf,t)
TNAf,t−1
, (2.1)
where TNAf,t is the assets under management of fund f in period t and rf,t is
the net return of fund f in period t. A fund is considered to have experienced
extreme outflows when Flowf,t is less than the tenth percentile of the entire
sample. The rest of the definition of MFFlow is given in the paper.
3 RavenPack News Analytics
This paper uses two editions of RavenPack News Analytics. The Dow
Jones edition compiles news reports and press releases from 2000 to 2014
82
published by Dow Jones Newswires, all editions of the Wall Street Journal,
Barron’s and MarketWatch. The PR edition includes firms’ press releases from
2004 to 2014 published in 22 different newswires and press release distribution
networks. My sample period starts in 2004 because during the first four years
the coverage of press releases is very limited and the Google Trends data starts
in 2004. RavenPack Event Taxonomy classifies corporate events into detailed
categories. The hierarchy of the taxonomy, from the highest level to the lowest
level, consists of “topic”, “group”, “type”, and “sub-type”. To measure firms’
product launch decisions, I use press releases in the type of “product-release”,
which include launches of new products or services or upgrades to existing
ones. Events with sub-type “delayed” are excluded.
RavenPack also provides a relevance score and a novelty score for each
press release-firm pair to summarize how related the firm is to the underlying
story and how novel the story is compared with previously reported stories.
The relevance and novelty scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 being the most
relevant/novel. I use the press releases of new products and services with rele-
vance and novelty scores both being 100. Selecting news items with the highest
possible relevance score reduces the noise in the data because a company may
be mentioned in a product press release, but is not the announcing company.
The novelty score filter avoids counting the same announcement multiple times.
RavenPack compiles press releases from multiple sources. Since the same event
may be covered by different sources, simply counting the number of releases
would not be equivalent to the number of new products. To mitigate this
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problem, I only select the news items with a novelty score of 100, meaning
that no similar news has been reported before.
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